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Summary 
 
 
Biodiversity loss has become a global concern.  We now realise that biodiversity directly 
affects our well-being, providing various services (esthetical values, goods, fibres, 
spiritual, regulation of climate, of illnesses, of air and water quality, protection against 
erosion, etc.).  However, biodiversity is now eroding at an alarming rate and habitat 
loss/conversion, climate change, nutrient loading, surexploitation, and invasive species 
have been identified as the main causes of this increasingly rapid biodiversity loss. 
 
One reason why biodiversity loss is still widespread is that markets generally fail to 
incorporate the total value associated to biodiversity (especially non-market values), 
which generates externalities and lead to what is known as market distortions.  This will 
often lead to unsustainable practices and discourage long term investments favouring 
natural resources conservation.  With the internalisation of all externalities, the market 
can achieve its role and allocate resources efficiently.  This can be done using economic 
instruments. 
 
Among the economic tools that can be used in biodiversity-related issues there is 
establishing property rights, market creation and enhancement, charges, fiscal 
instruments, financial assistance, liability systems and environmental funds.  Economic 
instruments have the potential to induce changes in behaviour in a cost-effective manner, 
they are also flexible tools that are recognized to increase the efficiency of environmental 
management, they generate financial resources, create incentives for investments, and 
stimulate private agents to engage in environmental protection.   
 
Although economic instruments can be effective and flexible mechanisms, strong 
limitations have been identified for their application in developing countries.  Among 
these constraints there are problems linked to the difficulty of valuing biodiversity, 
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institutional constraints, lack of inclusion of local communities, ideological resistance, 
administrative complexity and limited application in the context of threatened species. 
Although transfer of technological and financial support could help to resolve some 
institutional problems, other problems such as corruption can be much more difficult to 
address.  The challenge is thus to develop an integrated strategy that includes short-term 
direct conservation actions with longer term strategies oriented toward sustainable 
development.   
 
If one takes a look at the specific case of the north-eastern Brazilian Atlantic forest, 
biodiversity conservation represents a major challenge.  Effectively, the original cover 
has been reduced to 2% due to forest conversion for sugarcane production and forest lies 
on the private lands of sugarcane companies. Protection of biodiversity and associated 
ecosystem services thus require commitment of commodity producers, as well as direct 
investments in conservation. Economical instruments can be used to incite private 
companies to engage in conservation activities.  Examples of how economic instruments 
could be used include environmental certification and eco-labelling of companies 
engaging in conservation projects, charge schemes such as pesticide and fertilizer 
charges, tax deductions offered to companies that engage into reforestation or 
conservation activities, etc. 
 
Although application of economic tools can be strongly limited by institutional factors, 
they have a strong potential to stimulate conservation actions.  Perhaps, economic 
instruments must thus be implemented as part of a global strategy that will include both 
short-term direct actions and longer term initiatives.  This would include educational 
programs, economic instruments, and direct payments into a comprehensive strategy we 
would also work at reinforcing institutional frameworks. 
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Glossary 
 
Sustainable development:  development that meets the needs of the present without  
    compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
    own needs. 
 
Biodiversity:    the variability among living organisms from all sources and 
    the ecological complexes of which they are part. 
 
Conservation easements:   voluntary agreements that allow landowners to permanently 
    protect a piece of their land. 
 
Carrying capacity:    the maximum number of individuals of any species that can 
    be supported by a particular ecosystem on a long-term basis. 
 
Bioprospection:   identify genetic resources that may be used to develop products 
    of commercial value.  
 
Bounties:    A reward, inducement, or payment, especially one given by 
    a government for acts deemed beneficial to the state, such as 
    killing predatory animals, growing certain crops, starting  
    certain industries, or enlisting for military service. 
 vii
Signs, abbreviations and acronyms list 
 
ARPA : Programa Áreas Protegidas e Apoio ao Arpa (Amazônia) (Amazon Protected 
Areas) 
 
BPE : Best Practices in Ecotourism Program. Also known as MPE (Programa Melhores 
Práticas para o Ecoturismo)   
 
CABI : Capitania del Alto e Bajo Izozag (indigenous organisation representing the Guaranì-
Izoceños) 
 
CBD : Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
CBO : Community-based Organisation 
 
CDM : Clean Development Mechanism 
 
CER : Certified Emission Reductions 
 
CI : Conservation International 
 
CRMB : Coastal Resource Management Board (Philippines) 
 
CTA-ZM : Centro de tecnologias alternativas da zona de Mata de Minais Gerais 
 
FUNBIO : Brazilian Biodiversity Fund  Fundo brasileiro para a biodiversidade 
 
GEF : Global Environment Facility 
 viii
 
GMO : Genetically-modified organisms 
 
ICMS : Imposto sobre circulação de mercadorias e prestação de serviços (tax on the 
circulation of goods and services) 
 
IFC : International Finance Corporation 
 
ITQ : Individual Transferable Quotas 
 
ITR : Imposto territorial rural (Rural Land tax) 
 
IUCN : World Conservation Union 
MEA: Millenium Ecosystem Assessment 
 
NGO : Non-governmental Organisation 
 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
 
PACT: Protected Areas Conservation Trust (Belize) 
 
PAPS : Programa de Apoio à Produção Sustentável (Sustainable Production Support 
Program) 
 
PEFC : Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification 
 
PICUS : Programa Integrado de Conservação e uso sustentável da Biodiversidade  
(Integrated Program of Conservation & Sustainable Use of Biodiversity) 
 
 ix
RPPN : Reservas particulares do patrimonio natural  
 
SCBD: Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 
 
SGP : Small Grants Program 
 
SNUC : Sistema Nacional de Unidades de Conservação 
 
TDR : Tradable Development Rights 
 
TEV : Total Economic Value 
 
UNDP : United Nations Development Programme 
 
UNEP : United Nations Environment Programme  
 
UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 
WWF: World Wildlife Fund
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Introduction 
 
Nowadays, we are assisting to an evolution in the environmental awareness of governments 
and companies.  From a reactive strategy in response to environmental crisis, we are moving 
toward a sustainable development vision1.  However, biodiversity still continues to be 
depleted at an alarming rate.  This illustrates problems in development strategies at the world 
level.  Effectively, world population is growing at an exponential rate (Anton, 1995).  To 
sustain the needs of this growing population, development strategies often lead to 
environmental degradation at the local and global levels, which in turn results in a continued 
rapid biodiversity loss.  Not only are we eroding our natural capital, but these strategies are 
not even socially beneficial, and we are assisting to an increase in disparities between rich 
and poor social classes (Balmford et al., 2002).  Awareness is increasing, but development 
strategies still largely fail to protect biodiversity and are not on tract to meet the United 
Nations goals for human development and poverty eradication by 2015 (Balmford et al., 
2002). 
 
More precisely, biodiversity conservation has become a global preoccupation.  Biodiversity 
can be defined as the variability among living organisms from all sources and the 
ecological complexes of which they are part (CBD, 1992). It concerns not only the diversity 
of species but also diversity at the genomic and ecosystemic levels (CBD, 1992).  Preserving 
biodiversity is thus a multidimensional issue and no level of diversity can be neglected.  The 
loss of any one component of biodiversity thus implies much more than a loss of a direct 
function because of the interconnectedness of all levels.  The loss of a single species may 
thus impact the whole ecosystem.  If in 1992 the United Nations decided to create a 
Convention on Biological Diversity, it was because they were starting to realize that 
biodiversity loss has the potential to directly affect our well-being and that of future 
generations (SCBD, 2005).  This Convention was thus created to achieve three specific 
                                                
1 Sustainable development is defined as development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (United Nations, 1987). 
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objectives: conserve biological diversity, promote a sustainable use of its constituents and 
allow fair and equitable sharing of the benefits related to the utilization of genetic resources 
(SCBD, 2005).  Since then, the awareness has well evolved.  In 2001, the secretary general of 
the United Nations, Kofi Annan, inaugurated a vast initiative, the « Millenium Ecosystem 
Assessment » (MEA, 2005).  This program had the objective to update our knowledge 
concerning ecosystem changes and their impacts on our well-being and to determine action 
options in response to these changes.  Completed in March 2005, this study involved more 
than 1300 scientists from more than 95 countries and provides detailed information on the 
actual state of knowledge, which can serve to both decision-makers and the public (MEA, 
2005).  Preoccupations are real; from local issues of local pollution events, we now realize 
that the scope of our actions far exceeds the local level and that it can affects the whole 
planet.  Biodiversity loss is thus a global issue on which the whole international community 
must work. 
 
Effectively, in its report, the MEA estimated that the species extinction rate is now 100 to 
1000 times higher than the rate observed from fossil records.  If the actual tendency is 
maintained, this could well increase by an order of magnitude, which would correspond to an 
extinction rate varying between 1000 and 10 000 the fossil records rate (MEA, 2005).  In 
light of these results, it is appropriate to ask ourselves about the importance of biodiversity 
for our well-being.  In fact, benefits from biodiversity far exceed simple material goods.  
Effectively, in addition to provide food, fibers and drinkable water, biodiversity provides 
regulation services (regulation of climate, of illnesses, of air and water quality, protection 
against erosion etc.), cultural services (religious and spiritual values, educational values, 
inspiration, recreation, esthetical values, etc.) and support services (soil creation, 
photosynthesis, primary production, nutrient and water cycling, etc.) (MEA, 2005).  In order 
to incorporate the total value of biodiversity, we must considerate both use and non-use 
values.  Extraction of primary resources or recreative activities can be considered as direct 
use values, while ecosystem services represent indirect use values.  Still concerning use 
values, we also find the category of option value, which represent the preservation of a 
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resource for a future personal use.  If these values are easier to be determined, and thus to be 
reflected in the market prices, non-use values represent a more ethical category of values, 
which are often more difficult to be seized or translated in economic terms. It includes certain 
components of biodiversity that we wish to preserve for future generations (bequest values) 
or others such as the Panda bear, the Blue Whale or the Dugong, that we may never have the 
chance to see, but for which we feel satisfaction to know that they exist (existence value) 
(MEA, 2005).  Existence values often refer to cultural, religious or spiritual perceptions of 
nature (OECD, 1999).   
 
At the global level, five main direct causes to biodiversity loss have been identified (MEA, 
2005).  Actually, habitat loss and degradation is considered to be the greatest threat to 
biodiversity.  Effectively, world population is constantly growing which consequently exert 
strong pressures on ecosystems.  Forest conversion for agricultural purposes, deforestation, 
urban expansion and landscape fragmentation are all examples of these pressures.  Moreover, 
surexploitation is another vector directly affecting biodiversity.  More specifically, 
overfishing is the most important surexploitation form, with an estimation of about one-
fourth of worlds fisheries being overexploited and half being exploited at their maximal 
capacity.  In addition, as a result of the expansion of world trade and transportation systems, 
exotic species are causing more and more damages to the ecosystems.  Effectively, in the 
absence of natural predators, and with their aggressiveness and rapid dissemination abilities, 
exotic invasive species are able to quickly colonize ecosystems displacing native species and 
eventually causing biodiversity declines (MEA, 2005).  In Canada, it is estimated that the 
costs associated with exotic invasive species reach billions of dollars per year (Maxwell et 
al., 2002).  Moreover, anthropogenic nutrient loading (nitrogen, phosphorus, sulfur and other 
nutrient-associated pollutants) is another direct vector of ecosystem change in terrestrial, 
freshwater and costal ecosystems (MEA, 2005).  Aerial deposition of reactive (biologically 
available) nitrogen and phosphorous accumulation directly lead to diminutions in plant 
diversity and can cause algal blooms and lead to eutrophisation.  Finally, climate change 
could well become the most important driver for biodiversity loss in the future.  Effectively, 
 4
the exact impacts of climate changes are still difficult to predict, but they will certainly be 
major, mostly on species with limited distribution area, endangered species, species requiring 
large territories for their survival, and alpine species.   Moreover, coastal ecosystems could 
be strongly affected by the elevation of water levels (expected to reach 10 to 88 cm) and by 
the temperature elevation.  For example, corals are very sensitive to temperature variation.  A 
temperature increase of one degree Celcius or more would be sufficient to cause massive 
coral bleaching (MEA, 2005). 
 
Biodiversity thus represents goods and services that contribute to our well-being, some that 
can be privately owned some others that remain as public goods.  This intrinsic complexity of 
biological diversity and the variety of pressures to which it is exposed often makes it hard to 
find one unique solution for its conservation.  There is actually a growing understanding that 
economic instruments can be used as a way to increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness 
of environmental management and biodiversity conservation projects (UNEP, 2004).  The 
objective of this essay is to describe economic instruments and to explain why they offer a 
good potential in biodiversity-related issues. Examples of their application in Brazil will be 
given throughout their description, with a special emphasis on the Atlantic forest, where 
possible.  This will be followed by a critical analysis on their role and potential application in 
the context of global biodiversity conservation.   
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1. The economical science in biodiversity issues  a concept review 
 
 
It is generally widely recognised that one reason why biodiversity loss is still widespread, is 
that its adequate valuation is difficult (Ferraro & Kiss, 2003; OECD, 2005).  Effectively, 
markets generally fail to incorporate the total value associated to biodiversity (especially 
non-market values), which lead to what is known as market distortions (OECD, 2005).  This 
will often lead to unsustainable practices and discourage long term investments favouring 
natural resources conservation. In fact, non-sustainable activities that lead to ecosystem 
destruction or degradation are often more profitable at the short term than more sustainable 
practices (OECD, 2005).  However, at the long term, economic benefits of protecting 
biodiversity may far exceed short term benefits (Balmford et al., 2002).  In a study of 
Balmford and his colleagues (2002) on the total economic value (TEV) of biodiversity, the 
authors estimated that the overall benefit to cost ratio of an effective global program for the 
conservation of remaining wild nature would be at least 100:1.  Without proper valuation of 
biodiversity, when comparing two alternatives land use, non-sustainable or less sustainable 
land uses may be favoured over conservation (OECD, 2003).  For example, forest conversion 
to agriculture purposes will be estimated to have a greater economic value than forest 
preservation, which may not necessarily be the case.  The more the economic values of 
biodiversity remain unseized by markets, the more land use changes prejudicial to biological 
diversity have chances to be justified (OECD, 2003).  This implies that non-market values of 
biodiversity will not only need to be measured but they will need to be seized through a 
mechanism that will allow their conversion in financial fluxes or fluxes of resources (OECD, 
2003).  Market creation and economic incentives thus constitute interesting options for 
efficient monetary comparisons between sustainable use of an ecosystem and its destruction 
for an intensive exploitation activity. 
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The objective of the economical science is to manage scarcity; individuals desires and needs 
are infinite but production factors/resources are limited (OECD, 2004).  Another problem 
associated with biodiversity conservation is that economic policies are based on the notion 
that it is scarcity that gives economic value (OECD, 2004).  The complexity and 
interconnectedness of the components of biodiversity makes it harder to perceive scarcity.    
For example, the loss of one species may not seem to be very problematic but as species are 
interacting within ecosystems, the loss of one species can induce modifications that will 
ultimately affect the whole ecosystem functioning.  This difficulty in identifying scarcity 
related to biodiversity complexity can also explain why markets for biodiversity goods and 
services generally do not appear by themselves and will need to be implemented by 
government policies (OECD, 2004).  In fact, this represents a market failure (Lescuyer, 
2005).  The impacts of biodiversity loss are not properly represented in the markets; 
externalities are not taken into account, i.e. are not internalised.  Negative externalities 
represent negative impacts resulting from market transactions that affect economic agents 
(i.e. consumers or producers) that did not necessarily take part of the market transaction and 
that do not receive any compensation from this loss of well-being (Lescuyer, 2005).  For 
example, species losses will degrade certain ecological functions, i.e. generate a negative 
external effect for certain human populations which will not receive any monetary 
compensation for this degradation of their land (Lescuyer, 2005).  Often, environmental 
damages related to consumption and/or production of certain goods or services are not 
represented in the market prices (Tacheix, 2005).  Economic agents always seek to maximise 
their benefits.  If the environmental costs are not reflected in the market prices, an industry 
will have no incentive to invest in a more efficient technology or to adopt more 
environmentally-friendly strategy.  This gratuity of environmental goods and services thus 
contribute to distort choices of production factors toward technologies that will use more 
environmental capital.  Internalisation of externalities consists in finding ways for the 
decision-makers to take into account the external costs associated with their activities.  With 
the internalisation of all externalities, the market can achieve its role and allocate resources 
efficiently.  This can be done using economic instruments (OECD, 2004). 
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2. Economic instruments 
 
 
Economic instruments are defined by the UNEP (2004) as tools that affect estimates of costs 
and benefits of alternative actions open to economic agents.  The advantages of using 
economic instruments in biodiversity-related issues is that they have the potential to induce 
changes in behaviour in a cost-effective manner, they are also flexible tools that are 
recognized to increase the efficiency of environmental management, they also generate 
financial ressources, create incentives for investments, and stimulate private agents to engage 
in environmental protection (UNEP, 2004). In addition to their economical efficiency and 
flexibility, economic instruments allow internalisation of external effects (i.e. externalities) 
and represent incentives for technological changes (Klarer et al., 1999). 
 
The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP, 2004), has identified seven economic 
tools that can be used in biodiversity-related issues:  property rights, market creation and 
enhancement, charges, fiscal instruments, financial assistance, liabilty systems and 
environmental funds.  Each of them will now be described in details. 
 
 
2.1 Property rights 
 
Property rights can be established on land (e.g. a forest) or specific elements of biodiversity 
(e.g. a breeding couple of endangered birds).  It is well established that complete, exclusive, 
enforced and transferable property rights is an essential prerequisite for the efficient 
management of natural resources (SCBD, 2001).  In fact, it is estimated to be one of the first 
steps in improving patterns of ressources use (UNEP, 2004).  Incomplete or absent property 
rights result in a lack of private incentives to invest in conservation and sustainable use as 
these practices constitute initial investments that cannot be secured in the long term in the 
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absence of ownership (SCBD, 2001).  This is for example the case when biodiversity values 
take the form of public goods.  Under this scenario an industry has little incentive to limit the 
quantity of effluents it rejects for the benefits it would produce to the residents downstream, 
as it would not receive any monetary compensation (Tacheix, 2005).  On the other hand, 
privately owned forests may be highly dependent upon the attitude and values of its owner 
and changes in ownership may affect drastically the fate of the remnants (SCBD, 2001).  
This can be solved through mechanisms of payments for ecosystem services.  For example, 
the Costa Rican government recognizes the value of forests as carbon sinks, as providing 
hydrological services, as protecting biodiversity and as having a scenic value.  It has also 
established a financing mechanism and a regulation system to compensate forest owners for 
the ecosystem services they contribute to maintain (SCBD, 2001). However, while it is 
necessary to establish property rights for an efficient management, it may not always 
guarantee an adequate level of habitat protection.  In 1959, Ronald Coase stated that well-
defined property rights allow optimal allocation of resources (Raharinirina, 2005).  This 
theorem, known as the Coase Theorem, is now an important basis for most modern economic 
analyses (Raharinirina, 2005).  However, one of the conditions to this theorem is that 
transaction costs (ex: to evaluate the value of benefits or the value of compensations) must be 
limited, which is rarely the case when dealing with global issues such as biodiversity 
conservation (Harou & Stenger, 2005).  In addition, one problem when dealing with 
biodiversity issues is that the number of involved agents is often too important to ensure 
optimal resource allocation; that is, it may be difficult to identify owners or to distribute 
property rights in an equitable manner.  As a result, establishing well-defined property rights 
is a critical basic step for biodiversity conservation (SCBD, 2001), perhaps it must be 
followed by other strategies to develop economic alternatives (SCBD, 2001).  Property rights 
can also come from environmental measures such as conservation easements or communal 
property rights (UNEP, 2004).   
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2.1.1 Conservation easements 
 
Conservation easements are voluntary agreements that allow landowners to permanently 
protect a piece of their land (Nature Conservancy, 2006).  The easement represents a legally 
binding agreement that will permanently restrict the type and amount of development for the 
current and subsequent owners (Nature Conservancy, 2006).  In addition, it can also include 
obligations to carry out certain specific management practices (UNEP, 2004).  Conservation 
easements are enforced by land trusts that are responsible of monitoring and applying 
restrictions (UNEP, 2004).  Conservation easements are generally promoted through fiscal 
instruments such as tax deductions or exemptions (UNEP, 2004).   
 
In Brazil, voluntary conservation easements are multiplying in the private sector, generally in 
the form of private natural heritage reserves (RPPNs) that apply for Rural Land tax 
exemption (see section 3.4 on fiscal instruments) (Young, 2005).  Although RRPNs can play 
an important role in conserving biodiversity, they still represent a very small proportion of 
protected areas as a whole.  Moreover, as they are voluntary actions, they depend on the good 
will of landowners and may fail to address particular regional conservation priorities (Young, 
2005). 
 
2.1.2 Communal property rights  
 
Communal property rights operate as common property inside and as private property outside 
the social group (UNEP, 2004).  It is a form of land right that limits access to public land and 
establish a management system for a given natural resource or area to be respected by all 
community users (UNEP, 2004).  Not only does it promote community involvement in 
biodiversity conservation, but it can also contribute to safeguard traditional livelihoods & 
culture, improve food availability & nutrition, etc. (The World Ressources, 2005).  This form 
of land rights can be particularly interesting to secure rights of indigenous communities.  For 
example, in the 1990s, negociations between Bolivias government and an indigenous 
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organization representing the Guaranì-Izoceños (the Capitania del Alto y Bajo Izozog 
(CABI)) resulted in the creation of national park with 1.5 million hectares of adjacent land 
designed as a communally-owned indigenous territory for the Guaranì-Izoceño (The World 
Resources, 2005).  In addition to gain the exclusive rights to exploit their territory, this was a 
major step in preserving livelihoods and food security (The World Resources, 2005).   
 
Indigenous territories occupy more than one million acres in the Brazilian Amazon, which 
represents about 21% of the Amazonian forest (Schwartzman & Zimmerman, 2005).  These 
territories are distributed in 400 legally recognized reserves which encompass a wider range 
of ecosystems than all other types of protected areas combined.  The future of Amazonian 
reserves is thus of a major importance since indigenous lands and protected areas act as one 
of the most important barrier against forest fires and forest logging expansion along the 
deforestation arc.  If establishing property rights is an essential element to sustainable 
management of natural resources, it does not necessarily prevent resource overexploitation.  
This implies that indigenous peoples will necessitate new institutions to properly manage 
their natural resources (Schwartzman & Zimmerman, 2005).  Effectively, political and 
sociological changes within indigenous communities can lead to increased pressures on 
natural resources and to a gradual loss of traditional knowledge.  Perhaps, with adequate 
support they can control access to their territories and negotiate with the other social and 
economical actors at the local scale.  The challenge is thus to develop long term investment 
strategies and economic alternatives allowing to remunerate indigenous people for the 
ecosystem services they contribute to maintain.  Alliances with conservationists must also be 
stimulated to help to develop territorial control strategies and economic alternatives 
(Schwartzman & Zimmerman, 2005).   
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2.2 Market creation and market enhancement 
 
Market creation, even if not necessarily the least costly method, offers more flexibility than 
the other economic instruments (OECD, 2004). In fact, the general objective is to create the 
institutional framework for a better coordination of the transactions between those who 
supply and those who demand biodiversity-related products or services (OECD, 2004).  
Moreover, according to the OECD, market creation is an effective strategy because it is often 
the most direct way to address the problem of biodiversity loss (OECD, 2004).   Biological 
agriculture, sustainable forestry, non-timber forest products and genetic resources markets 
have been identified as particularly promising (OECD, 2003). 
 
Markets can be created or enhanced in order for the value of products and services of 
biodiversity to be better captured (UNEP, 2004).  Market enhancement can be done by 
increasing incentives offered to producers whose activities promote biodiversity 
conservation.  Examples of new markets or market enhancement include carbon 
sequestration offsets, tradable development rights, tradable quota system, eco-labelling and 
certification, and bioprospection (UNEP). 
 
2.2.1 Tradable quotas 
 
Tradable quotas can be used to directly target the protection of one species or one natural 
resource (e.g. fisheries) or can be used to regulate something that will indirectly affect 
biodiversity (e.g. tradable quota system for greenhouse gases).   
 
It has been established that climate changes will have an impact on ecosystems as well as on 
species (especially alpine species and those requiring large territories for their survival) 
(MEA, 2005).  A system of emissions trading (or carbon sequestration offsets) has been 
proposed by the Kyoto protocol as a mechanism to reduce greenhouse gases emissions 
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(UNFCCC, 1998). This system of tradable quotas targets climate changes but will indirectly 
impact biodiversity.  For example, this mechanism could encourage landholders to maintain 
forest cover or to reforest land by providing a market that allows them to be compensated for 
the opportunity cost of conservation (UNEP, 2004).  Forests are considered as carbon sinks 
and can plan an important role in mitigating CO2 emissions (Backéus et al., 2005). As a 
result, landholders, by providing a guarantee to maintain natural vegetation or to reforest 
land, can guarantee to maintain a certain level of carbon sequestration and this can be sold to 
investors interested in offsetting their emissions (UNEP, 2004). In addition to the emissions 
trading system, the Kyoto Protocol proposes another mechanism for countries to fulfill their 
reduction commitments which is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (UNFCCC, 
1998).  Under the CDM, industrialized countries (known as Annex-I parties) have the 
opportunity to implement projects that will reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in 
developing countries (Non-Annex I Parties), in return for Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs) (UNFCCC, 1998).  Annex-I countries can thus participate in afforestation and 
reforestation projects in non-Annex I countries (e.g. Brazil); activities that can contribute to 
biodiversity conservation (Olschewski et al., 2005).  Under the CDM, land use, land-use 
change and forestry activities subjected to earn CERs are limited to afforestation and 
reforestation activities (Jung, 2005).  This represents a major limitation to its application in 
Brazil where the most important source of greenhouse gas emissions comes from forest 
conversion to agriculture (mainly in the Amazonian region) (Young, 2005).  The Brazilian 
government agreed on the rule limiting eligibility for CERs to afforestation and reforestation 
activities, rendering ineligible projects that avoid deforestation.  Carbon markets were 
expected to represent a major potential source of funding for conservation projects, but under 
this rule, resources that can be obtained under the Kyoto Protocol are limited (Young, 2005). 
 
Moreover, tradable quotas can be applied to a number of areas directly related to 
biodiversity. One well-known example concerns fisheries (UNEP, 2004).  Traditionally, 
input controls (net mesh size, vessel size restrictions, fishing day restrictions, etc.) were used 
to manage fisheries (Gibbs, in-press).  Although relatively cheap and easy to implement, 
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input control has not succeed in properly managing world fisheries (MEA, 2005).  As 
mentioned earlier actually one-fourth of fisheries are being overexploited (Gibbs, in-press).  
In order to address the issue of overexploitation, individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have 
been distributed as a way to create clear property rights that would limit the open access 
regime (OECD, 2003).  Fisheries managers have determined the carrying capacity2 of the 
fishery and have distributed individual quotas to fishers accordingly (the sum of the ITQs 
does not exceed the carrying capacity of the ecosystem) (UNEP, 2004).  Quotas are tradable 
so that individuals who wish to diminish their fishing effort can sell their quotas to 
individuals who wish to increase their production rate or to enter the market.  Prices of the 
quota are determined by the market (UNEP, 2004).  In certain ecosystems such as marine 
ecosystems, carrying capacity may be difficult to determine as it requires detailed 
information on energy transfers between trophic levels, on primary and secondary 
production, etc. (Schwartz., 2005).  However, tradable quotas is a flexible and efficient 
mechanism that allows to determine directly the total catch (excluding illegal fishing).  
Management strategies focussing on input controls have the potential to influence the fishing 
effort by imposing regulations on the vessel size or on net mesh size, but have no direct 
control on the total harvest output (Gibbs, in-press).  Tradable quotas are also more flexible 
because managers can decide to increase or decrease the number of available quotas, which is 
much easier than to change regulations (Webster, 2005).   
 
2.2.2 Tradable development rights (TDRs) 
 
Similarly, tradable development rights can be established.  The tradable development right 
system differs from strict zonation in that it offers the possibility for people living in 
conservation areas to be compensated for the fact that they cannot develop their land 
(Chomitz, 1999).  In fact, development rights or credits can be attributed to people living in 
conservation areas (where development is prohibited) equivalent to the number of hectares 
                                                
2 Carrying capacity is defined as the maximum number of individuals of any species that can be supported by a 
particular ecosystem on a long-term basis (Cunningham et al., 2003).   
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they own that are under protection (UNEP, 2004).  On the other hand, these development 
credits can be purchased by landowners willing to develop but that need to comply with 
regulations on legal reserve requirements (UNEP, 2004).  This offers a monetary 
compensation to landowners of areas reserved for conservation, while allowing landowners 
to comply with protected areas requirements legislations (Chomitz, 1999).   
 
Tradable development rights have not been widely used in Brazil (Young, 2005).   However, 
recently, local legislations in the states of Mato Grosso and Paraná have been modified to 
allow trading in forest set asides.  The Brazilian Forest Code of 1965 indicates a minimum 
percentage of private properties (larger than 50 hectares) that must be maintained under 
natural forest cover. Percentages vary in function of the biomes.  In the Atlantic forest biome, 
20% must be set aside as forest reserves.  It is now possible for landowners with inadequate 
forest coverage to acquire protected forest elsewhere to comply with legislation requirements 
(Young, 2005).  Legal reserve property owners given development rights can thus sell their 
rights to developers, as long as they are located in the same ecosystem and that they preserve 
forest of equal or greater ecological value (Chomitz, 1999).  In addition to its flexibility, the 
TDRs system has several advantages over the old legislation.  First of all, reserve creation 
can be concentrated in regions of higher biological diversity and endemism.  In addition, one 
of the greatest ecological advantages of allowing this increased flexibility is that the old 
legislation tended to lead to fragmentation.  By acquiring development rights from reserve 
landowners, the size of the reserves can be increased.  Moreover, reserve management is 
effectuated by the reserve owner which offers a considerable advantage for the buyer willing 
to earn development credits over buying forested land elsewhere for which it will be 
responsible for its conservation (Chomitz, 1999). 
 
2.2.3 Eco-labelling and environmental certification 
 
One of the reasons why markets generally fail to incorporate the values of biodiversity is the 
lack of information.  Ways to remediate to this situation include eco-labelling and 
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environmental certification.  These strategies are based on the principle that if information on 
environmental consequences linked to the inputs, to the products or to the production factors 
are available, behaviours (i.e. the consumers choice) can be modified.  These strategies have 
gained considerable attention from the private sector and are now often voluntary processes 
(UNEP, 2004).  They enable consumers to differentiate between production techniques, 
product qualities or producing organization (UNEP, 2004).  Because determining the 
environmental impacts of good production may be a difficult task, eco-labelling and 
environmental certification can help making trade and environmental protection being 
mutually supportive (Engel, 2004).  Effectively, unlike appearance, flavour or durability, that 
are generally revealed, environmental attributes may never be perceived (Hamilton & 
Zilberman, in-press).  Examples of environmental certification include timber certification 
systems such as those used by Canada, Indonesia, Brazil, Costa Rica, and groups of Nordic 
and African countries.  The European Union has also introduced a labelling system to 
identify GMOs.  These systems allow the consumer to be better informed and thus to better 
express its preferences for product attributes such as recycled, biodegradable, sustainable, or 
non-toxic (Hamilton & Zilberman, in-press).  In addition, it allows internalisation of the 
environmental costs related to unsound production (Engel, 2004).  Consumers are more and 
more aware of the importance of preserving the environment, and consequently biodiversity.  
In United States, green products represent 9% of new products.  This apparent willingness to 
pay for environmentally-friendly products has been traduced, for example, by the 
development of markets for products such as dolphin-safe tuna and organic food (OBrien & 
Teisl, 2004).  Eco-labelling and environmental certification are strategies designed to reward 
producers that integrate environmental considerations into production and this is possible 
because consumers may be willing to pay important price premiums for environmentally 
certified products or products with environmental attributes (UNEP, 2004 ; Hamilton & 
Zilberman, in-press). 
 
In 2005, Brazils national certification system for sustainable forest management was 
endorsed through the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC) 
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Council (PEFC, 2006).  They thus have their own national certification system proving that 
timber comes from sustainable forest management practices that respect social, ecological 
and economical functions of forests (PEFC, 2006).  Certification of forest products is an 
incentive that has a great potential for forest conservation (Young, 2005). 
 
2.2.4 Bioprospection 
 
Bioprospection is another economical instrument that has been identified as having the 
potential to contribute to biodiversity conservation (UNEP, 2004).  Bioprospections goal is 
to identify genetic resources that may be used to develop products of commercial value » 
(UNEP, 2004).   The Convention on Biological Diversity recognizes countries sovereignty 
over their biological resources (thus including genetic resources), giving the responsibility of 
regulating access to genetic resources and legislation implementation to the countries 
governments (Raharinirina, 2005).  Bioprospectors conduct scientific research to find genetic 
resources that will have an application in the pharmaceutical industry, horticulture, cosmetics 
industry, botany, or agriculture (UNEP, 2004). In addition, bioprospection include collecting 
indigenous knowledge that can help to identify new genetic or biochemical resources 
(Dutfield, 2002).  Prior to the CBD, genetic resources were considered as a common heritage 
of humankind and industrialized countries could benefit from this free access to effectuate 
bioprospecting activities without any restrictions (Raharinirina, 2005).  Giving property 
rights to countries over their genetic resources is seen as an opportunity for developing 
countries to exploit their genetic resources, to receive adequate economic returns that will 
benefit to local communities and to maintain the objective of conservation and sustainable 
use (Raharinirina, 2005).  Following the Coases Theorem on property rights, establishing 
clear property rights is supposed to lead to an optimal allocation of resources and to equitable 
benefit-sharing.  In fact, bioprospection agreements unfortunately do not necessarily lead to 
the economic and environmental sustainability promoted by the CBD (Raharinirina, 2005).  
A few factors can explain why bioprospection often fails to meet goals of biodiversity 
conservation and equitable sharing of benefits.  First of all, the principle of equitable sharing 
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of benefits is rarely respected by bioprospectors because no strict scheme of application of 
bioprospecting agreements is imposed by the CBD.  Moreover, pharmaceutical industries are 
in low numbers and can choose from a variety of potential developing countries to provide 
inputs.  Developing countries are thus competing with each other because they do not 
succeed to cooperate to improve the genetic resources market (Raharinirina, 2005).  In 
addition, bioprospecting companies deny the fact that important economical benefits are 
generated from this activity.  Effectively, as they have to evaluate various potential species to 
find a single active principle, economical repercussions are not stable and secured.  In 
addition, short term local development preoccupations will often compete with 
environmental preoccupations.  Benefits from genetic resources exploitation may thus often 
be directed to meet short term needs rather than being directed to conservation (Raharinirina, 
2005).  
 
 
To conclude this section on market for biodiversity, while some products or services can be 
marketed such as genetic resources, marketing biodiversity generally remains a complex 
task, primarily because products and services resulting from biodiversity generally exhibit 
characteristics of public goods (OECD, 2003).  For example, someones use (direct or 
indirect) of a biodiversity-related good or service will often not limit its use by others.  Public 
characteristics of biodiversity goods and services create a market failure which limits their 
easy transaction in markets.   As a result, prices generally do not reflect the totality of the 
value society attributes to biodiversity (OECD, 2003).  In the case of a pure public good or 
service (e.g. existence of a species, aesthetic value of nature, etc.),  for which developing or 
enhancing markets may be difficult, the solution could be to couple this non-marketable good 
or service with another biodiversity-related product that is more easily marketable.  In doing 
so, pure public goods conservation can be achieved without needing to rely on direct 
governmental or private financing (OECD, 2003).   
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2.3 Charges 
 
In areas capable of supporting a certain level of exploitation and frequentation, users can be 
charged for ecosystem services and/or products (UNEP, 2004).  Charge systems are 
interesting ways to promote natural resources conservation and market creation while 
providing financial revenues for resources management and protection. Various charge 
schemes can be used depending on the nature of the area where conservation can be 
achieved.  Perhaps, as they imply a certain level of utilisation, their applicability is quite 
limited in areas requiring strict conservation.  Charges are widely applied in protected areas 
such as national parks.  They include entrance fees, concession payments for tourism, and 
hunting and fishing fees (UNEP, 2004).  Concessions generally work on the basis that a 
private operator will be allowed to conduct and operate tourism facilities within a national 
park in return for concession payments (Fearnhead, 2003).  Concession agreements will 
generally be associated with a series of financial, environmental, social, etc., obligations.  As 
the other type of charges, concession payments for tourism generate revenues that can be 
reinvested to finance the park conservation and management activities (Fearnhead, 2003).  
When charges are used in the context of agricultural biodiversity conservation, charges per 
unit of pesticide or fertilizer can be used (UNEP, 2004).   
 
 
 2.4 Fiscal instruments 
 
Fiscal instruments such as taxes and tax exemptions may be applied to discourage 
unsustainable production and consumption practices or to encourage environmentally-sound 
projects (UNEP, 2004).  As for charges, fiscal instruments also raise funds that can be 
reinvested in biodiversity protection or conservation initiatives.  Taxes schemes include 
differential land use taxation (e.g. higher taxes for land used for development), deforestation 
taxes (e.g. based on the amount of extracted wood) and tax exemptions or deductions (e.g. 
for activities that support conservation and sustainable use) (UNEP, 2004). Different 
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approaches can be used in tax implementation (OECD Observer, 2001).  It can be based on 
declared intention of governments which will include the inscription of the fiscal instrument 
(e.g. taxes) and its motive to the text of law.  For example, it could be stated that to reduce 
pollutant emissions in watercourses, a tax will be imposed on industrial emissions.  A second 
approach concerns taxes that seek to incite consumers to adopt behaviours that lead to 
environment improvement. For example, a tax on gasoline has the effect of increasing prices 
which reduces consumption and thus decreases emissions of pollutants (OECD Observer, 
2001).  Removal or mitigation of perverse fiscal policies may also sometimes be necessary to 
promote biodiversity protection (UNEP, 2004).  This includes subsidies in the agricultural, 
fisheries and other natural resources sectors.  Effectively, if subsidies to agriculture lead to 
forest conversion into agricultural fields, it may be necessary to remove these perverse 
incentives before trying to apply taxes.  Moreover, some countries apply high import taxes on 
technologies.  These should be reviewed to facilitate transfer of technologies related to 
biodiversity protection (UNEP, 2004).   
 
In Brazil, a tax on the circulation of goods and services (ICMS) is collected by state 
governments (Young, 2005).  A portion of the revenues form the ICMS must be redistributed 
among municipalities.  Some states have created environmental criteria for tax redistribution 
among municipalities e.g. to reward for protected areas of watershed reserves.  Under this 
scheme, tax revenues redistribution is made as a proportion of the municipality designated as 
a reserve, acting as a strong incentive to develop new protected reserves (Young, 2005). Such 
a scheme has been implemented in the Brazilian state of Paraná where the number of 
protected areas has increased of 165% (Tabarelli et al., 2005).  
 
Another fiscal instrument that has had significant impact is the environmental 
compensation scheme introduced as part of the law on National Protected Areas System 
(Sistema Nacional de Unidades de Conservação (SNUC)) (Young, 2005).  This legislation 
obliges any private or public entity to engage in a project that will have a significant 
environmental impact to pay a certain percentage of the total value of the project as a 
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compensation for environmental damages.  The minimum value was fixed to 0.5% of the 
project value and so far ranged between around 2 to 3.5%.  The percentage varies according 
to the degree of impact and will be used to create and manage strictly protected areas.   
Limitations associated with the environmental compensation scheme include problems in 
defining significant environmental impact and a lack in adequate institutional structure to 
manage the funds (Young, 2005).  
 
Moreover, the Brazilian land use taxation scheme was revised in the 1990s to create a better 
incentive for forest protection (Young, 2005).  Prior to this revision, forests were subject to 
higher taxes than agriculture and ranching which were considered as more productive 
activities.  This distortion was corrected and private protected reserves (RPPNs) registered by 
the Brazilian Institute for the Environment (IBAMA) are now exempted from the Rural Land 
tax (ITR).  Although this was done as to create an incentive for forest conservation, the 
impacts were not significant due to tax evasion (Young, 2005). 
 
 
2.5 Financial assistance 
 
Financial assistance for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use can be achieved 
through various other financial mechanisms beyond fiscal instruments and charges (UNEP, 
2004).  These include small targeted grants, bounties and other cash rewards, conservation 
leasing, and soft credits.   
 
2.5.1 Small targeted grants 
 
Small targeted grants channel financial and technical support to non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and community-based organisations (CBOs) that are involved in 
biodiversity conservation or promotion of sustainable use and management of biodiversity.  
Small targeted grants can be implemented within an integrated conservation and 
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development project to support community participation and to offset costs associated with 
conservation, or to directly finance biodiversity conservation projects (UNEP, 2004).  The 
small grants programme (SGP) is a corporate program funded by the Global Environment 
Facility (GEF) of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (SGP, 2004).  The SGP 
supports activities of NGOs and CBOs in developing countries in five focal areas: 
biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land degradation and persistent organic 
pollutants.  The proportion of small grants invested in biodiversity projects is 
approximatively 60% (SGP, 2004).  Small targeted grants are transfer payments of a limited 
duration of one to two years (UNEP, 2004).    
 
2.5.2 Bounties3 or other cash rewards  
 
Bounties4 or other cash rewards can also be used to encourage conservation of endangered 
species on private lands (UNEP, 2004).  This can be made on the basis of individuals or 
breeding pairs of endangered species found on their land.  The monetary reward thus gives an 
incentive to protect the species (UNEP, 2004).   
 
2.5.3 Conservation leasings 
 
Similarly, conservation leasings involve government agencies or private organisation that 
will offer payments to landowners that accept to protect an endangered species for a given 
period of time (UNEP, 2004).   
 
                                                
3  A reward, inducement, or payment, especially one given by a government for acts deemed  beneficial to the 
state, such as killing predatory animals, growing certain crops, starting certain  industries, or enlisting for military 
service. (The American Heritage Dictionary of the English  Language, 2000) 
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2.5.4 Soft credits 
 
Finally, soft credits are loans with flexible forms of payment or lower interest rates used to 
finance projects that combine conservation and economic returns for the landowner (e.g. 
ecotourism, organic agriculture, and sustainable extraction of forest products) (UNEP, 2004). 
 
 
2.6 Liability systems 
 
The objective of liability mechanisms is to ensure that polluters or individuals that engage in 
environmentally risky behaviours will pay for the environmental damages that they are 
causing (UNEP, 2004).  Environmental fines can be applied to companies that do not respect 
environmental regulations as a disincentive to engage in practices that are armful for the 
environment.  To be efficient, managers must determine fines that represent an important 
opportunity cost for non-compliance and a monitoring system needs to be implemented to 
identify adequately contraveners.  Environmental fines can also be used to yield revenues 
that can finance environmental cleanup, site restoration or other environmental projects.  
Another liability system that can be used in the case of biodiversity conservation is 
environmental performance bonds.  Under this scenario, polluters or users may be required to 
pay a deposit that will only be refunded if compliance with environmental or natural 
resources requirements is achieved (UNEP, 2004).   
 
 
2.7 Environmental Funds 
 
While not per se economic instruments, environmental funds are appropriate for long-term 
issues and can be used as complements to economic instruments (UNEP, 2004). The 
objective of these funds is generally to complement other economic tools.  A combination of 
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more than one environmental fund can also be used. They include endowment, sinking, 
revolving, biodiversity venture capital and ethical investment funds (UNEP, 2004).   
 
2.7.1 Endowment funds 
 
Endowment funds consist in funds for which only the incomes realized from the capital are 
spent, while the capital remain untouched (UNEP, 2004).  The capital can provide from 
international donors and be combined with host country governmental contribution, or can be 
established using the mechanism of debt-for-nature swaps (Resor, 1997).  Debt-for-nature 
swaps were initiated in 1984 by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) as a mechanism to multiply 
conservation efforts in developing countries.  It generally involves a conservation 
organisation that will purchase foreign debt of a developing country which will engage in 
conservation activities in return.  For example, following a debt-for-nature swap in 1988, the 
Philippinian environmental foundation Haribon Foundation used the funds from the debt 
swap to engage in a series of conservation actions such as enhancement management support 
for national parks and local training.  Debt-for-nature swaps rely on willingness of financial 
institution to sell foreign debt at a cost lower than the actual loan.  They would accept to do 
so because many indebted countries have been unable to fully repay their loans and may well 
never be able to do so.  The country who wishes to benefit from the debt-for-nature swap 
needs to establish general guidelines of the conservation actions to be implemented and call 
for conservation organization participation (Resor, 1997).  Debt can be converted in local 
currencies to invest in conservation activities and can also constitute an endowment fund that 
can provide a long term source of revenues to engage conservation actions with long term 
horizons (Resor, 1997).  For example, two swaps were carried out in Ecuador in 1987 and 
1989 and funded a $10 million conservation program.  The Central Bank of Ecuador paid out 
swap proceeds over a period of nine years to an Ecuadorian conservation NGO, Fundación 
Natura, with a percentage invested in an endowment fund annually.  This $10 million swap 
program generated more than an additional $10 million in local currency for conservation in 
Ecuador and will continue to yield revenues.  In Brazil, there is no record of debt-for-nature 
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swaps since 1992.  In fact, the success of debt-for-nature swaps relies on both the viability of 
the proposed program and on the capacity of implementing and managing it.  In the 
conservation history of Brazil, lack of human, financial and institutional resources often 
constituted strong limitations to properly implement conservation actions.  Moreover, while 
debt-for-nature swaps were very popular in the early 90s, they have considerably reduced in 
numbers since then.  Effectively, in addition to organizational and institutional limitations, 
many countries have undergone structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in the mid- to late-
90s, which have reduced considerably the premium associated with debt conversion (Resor, 
1997).  Reductions in debt swaps were thus in part the result of the relative improvement of 
their debt situation.  Actually, debt-for-nature swaps still represent a good opportunity on a 
case-by-case basis, but have reached a point of limited potential because a major portion of 
the debt of highly indebted countries are in the form of multilateral development bank 
(MDB) debt, for which conversion through the debt swap proceed is actually not possible 
(Resor, 1997).  As a result, other initiatives for sustained funds will need to be developed. 
 
2.7.2 Sinking funds 
 
Sinking funds differ from endowment funds in that the initial capital investment, in addition 
to yield income that will be directed to conservation, the capital is gradually used over a 
fixed period (Resor, 1997).  The Brazilian Biodiversity Fund (FUNBIO) is an example of this 
kind of fund (FUNBIO, 2003).  Created in 1995 from a $20 million donation of the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) through a contract with the World Bank, FUNBIOs mission is 
to catalyze resources to support strategic actions of conservation and sustainable use of 
biodiversity in Brazil.  In order to achieve these objectives, the investment of the GEF is 
completed by private investments and donations from companies or organizations interested 
to participate in the efforts for biological diversity conservation.  Created as an innovative 
fund, FUNBIO seeks diversification of its activities by financing both public and private 
agents and projects with different modalities, biomes and regions.  Facing the necessity of 
developing new sources of financing, FUNBIO developed partnerships for the creation of 
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other funds with specific approaches in sectors lacking stimulation and support.  From these 
new partnerships funds (Fundos de parceiras), seven projects have been supported. 
Currently four modalities of support have been identified:  biodiversity conservation, 
sustainable use associated to conservation of biodiversity, development of applied research 
whose result may provide input to conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, 
and analyses and studies of policies and measures for conserving biological resources and 
stimulating their sustainable use.  Other programs implemented include the Sustainable 
Production Support Program (PAPS), Ford Foundation/FUNBIO Program, the Best Practices 
in Ecotourism Program (BPE), Amazon Protected Areas (ARPA), and more recently the 
Integrated Program of Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity (PICUS).  Example 
of projects financed through the FUNBIO programs include the Strategic plan for 
conservation and sustainable use of the Atlantic forests biodiversity (Association for the 
protection of the North-eastern Atlantic forest - PICUS), the Project of education and 
environmental recuperation of the Atlantic forest in the Rio Doce Valley (Instituto Terra  
Partnership fund), and the Project of economical sustainable based on the valorization of 
biodiversity in familiar agricultural systems (Centro de Tecnologias Alternativas da Zona da 
Mata de Minais Gerais (CTA-ZM)  Ford Foundation/FUNBIO) (FUNBIO, 2003). 
 
2.7.3 Revolving funds 
 
Another type of fund that has been proposed as a complement to economic instruments by 
the UNEP (2004) is revolving funds.  Revolving funds consist in finding a source of revenues 
that will perpetuate over time such as earmarked taxes or fees, and continually spends these 
revenues (WWFa, 2006).  New sources of revenues also include charges for specific 
environmental services, membership fees and individual donations, or conservation fees paid 
for example by all foreign tourists (Resor, 1997).  The objective is to be able to develop 
conservation financing in-country rather than to rely on external sources (WWFb, 2006).  
Examples of successful projects of revolving funds include the Protected Areas Conservation 
Trust (PACT) of Belize and scuba diving user fees in Mabini, Philippines.  In Belize, an 
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entrance fee of 3.75$ was implemented for all foreign tourists and a 20 percent commission 
on recreation-related license fees and concession fees in public protected areas was also 
developed (WWFb, 2006).  Since its creation in 1996, over 30 protected area management 
and conservation programs were financed by the revenues generated by the PACT.  Only in 
2001, the PACT yielded over $700 000 which not only contributed to support biodiversity 
protection, but also the economic development of the country (WWFb, 2006).  Similarly, in 
Mabini, Philippines, a dive fee system was created to generate fund to deal with the issue of 
pollution and exploitation from unregulated human activities that was threatening the 
municipal waters in the absence of an adequate system of resources use and protection 
(WWFb, 2006).  A Coastal Resource Management Board (CRMB) was also created to ensure 
that funds would be directed to conservation, protection and management.  The CRMB also 
implemented marine sanctuary policies, waste management programs, and an enforcement 
patrol (WWFb, 2006).    The PACT of Belize could serve as an example of revolving fund 
that could also be used in public nature reserves of the Brazilian Atlantic Forest to generate 
sustainable financing. However, as most of the remaining Atlantic forests of north-eastern 
Brazil are located on private lands (Tabarelli et al., 2005), the potential of this type of fund is 
unfortunately limited in the perspective of new reserve creation.  Revolving funds could be 
implemented in already existing public protected areas.  While revolving funds are not 
economic instruments on their own, conservation fees and charges are economic instruments 
that were discussed earlier (see section 3).  
 
2.7.4 Biodiversity venture capital funds 
 
Biodiversity venture capital funds are another type of funding opportunity that is designed to 
address the special needs of inherently high-risk biodiversity-related business activities 
(UNEP, 2004).  Often, traditional financial institutions will not or will be hesitant to invest in 
biodiversity-related initiatives that represent higher risk (Moles, 2003). This risk aversion 
explains why the inherent high risks of biodiversity-related projects (subject to natural 
disasters, volatile markets, etc.) can act as a barrier to entry to most traditional financial 
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institution (UNEP, 2004).  Effectively, wild populations exhibit a great degree of variability 
(seasonal, annual, between forest types, etc.) and unpredictability in resource productivity 
(Neumann & Hirsch, 2000).  Venture capitalists often work in a high-risk/high-return 
scenario and will accept to finance activities, trusting the market and the entrepreneurial 
potential of managers, but will also often expects larger returns than traditional equity 
investors (Moles, 2003).  The first biodiversity venture capital fund to be created was 
effectuated by the Terra Capital Fund.  Terra Capital was created in 1998 by the 
Environmental Assistance Fund and A2R, a socially responsible fund management company 
based in São Paulo, Brazil. Also funded by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
Terra Capital has made the first investment in a certified non-timber product from the 
Brazilian Atlantic forest. Other sectors of investment opportunities for biodiversity venture 
capital fund include organic agriculture, sustainable tourism, timber and non-timber forest 
product extraction, and sustainable fisheries (Moles, 2003).  Other examples of biodiversity 
venture capital funds include the Kijani facility which combines the expertise of the World 
Conservation Union (IUCN) and of the IFC (Vorhies, 2002).  Kijani is looking for potential 
investments in areas such as ecotourism and organic agriculture throughout Africa.  There is 
also Conservation International (CI) that has created the Conservation Entreprise Fund.  One 
of the funds investments helped to develop a project of organic coffee in Chiapas, Mexico.  
Moreover, The Nature Conservancy developed the EcoEntreprises Fund and one of its 
projects is a Bolivian joint venture for the production of biodiversity-friendly pharmaceutical 
products to be exported to the United States (Vorhies, 2002).  Biodiversity venture capital 
funds represent only a small portion of venture capital funds.  They are currently widely used 
in the technology development sector, but some characteristics of biodiversity-related 
projects create limitations to their application in this sector (Moles, 2003).  Effectively, 
venture funds rely on the entrepreneurial capacities of managers.  As most biodiversity linked 
businesses are often located in remote locations, entrepreneurs are often rare and managers 
often are not properly trained to develop and implement management plans.  Capacity 
building will be an important element to be developed in order to venture funds to work in 
the biodiversity sector.  Moreover, other limitations include problems associated with 
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enforcement of contracts and regulations in developing countries, and limited liquidity of 
biodiversity-related businesses in comparison with other sectors where venture funds are 
applied (Moles, 2003). 
 
2.7.5 Ethical investment funds 
 
The last category of environmental funds consists in ethical investment funds that are broad-
based instruments that will look for projects that would fulfill certain ethical, social or 
environmental criteria (UNEP, 2004).   
 
 
Throughout the description of the different categories of environmental funds, we have tried 
to demonstrate how they can be applied in the context of the Atlantic forest conservation.  
Although it was possible to enumerate a few examples where these funds have been applied 
in the past, it is impossible to indicate which fund could be used in the specific case of the 
north-eastern Brazilian Atlantic forest or even for Serra Grande.  However, it is important to 
understand the general objectives of each type of fund and to get familiarized with each one 
of them.  Knowing and understanding funds that exist allow managers or conservation 
organization, when facing a precise need for conservation, reforestation, reserve creation, 
capacity building, etc., to focus their researches for the appropriate fund.  For example, we 
know that FUNBIOs funds work on a basis of call for projects.  The specific objectives of 
each project call differ in order to diversify activities and to represent all Brazilian regions.  
FUNBIO has already financed projects in the Atlantic forest, and it thus represents a 
potential source of financing.   
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3. The role and application of economic instruments for biodiversity 
conservation 
 
 
Given the forecast increase in the human population of approximatively 3 billion by 2050 
and the fact that some 1.2 billion people still live on less than 1 US$ per day, development is 
clearly essential (Balmford et al., 2002).  It would not be realistic to engage in strategies that 
would only focus on biodiversity conservation as economic and social pressures would 
sooner or later compromise its long term efficacity.  The idea is, rather than focussing solely 
on environmental protection, to develop integrated strategies that will combine social, 
economical and environmental goals as to be sustainable in the long term.  The concept of 
sustainable development lies in the inclusion of the three sphere of development mentionned 
above (sociological, economical and environmental), at the short and long terms in the optic 
of preserving the choice capacity of future generation (NRC, 2002).  The objective of 
policies is generally not to completely stop biodiversity loss, it is rather to reach a more 
sustainable use of ressources and a level of conservation that will benefit a maximum of 
people (OECD, 2003).  At the present, the problem is that we are converting and degrading 
habitats for short-term private gains without realizing that we are affecting and eroding the 
overall human welfare (Balmford et al., 2002).  As mentioned earlier, this is recognised by 
economists to be the result of market distortions preventing economic agent from taking 
sound decisions (Lescuyer, 2005).  Economic instruments are designed to address market 
failures by internalising external effects related to biodiversity use (Harou & Stenger, 2005). 
 
 
In the prior section, we have described the categories of economic instruments that can be 
used in the context of biodiversity conservation and provided examples of situations where it 
has been applied.  Throughout this description, we have seen various examples of situations 
where it has been applied and a few limitations have been identified.  For example, 
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differential land use taxation system to favour forest conservation over land conversion for 
agriculture or ranching failed to provide significant impacts due to tax evasion.  In fact, while 
it is true that economic instruments can support biodiversity conservation, they also have 
significant limitations (UNEP, 2004).  These include problems linked to the difficulty of 
valuing biodiversity, institutional constraints, lack of inclusion of local communities, 
ideological resistance, administrative complexity and limited application in the context of 
threatened species (UNEP, 2004).  While some constraints are related to the intrinsic nature 
of biodiversity, other are related to the context in which the projects are implemented.   
 
As introduced in the section 2, the intrinsic nature of biodiversity makes it difficult to 
properly measure and value biodiversity, because it has ethical, cultural and spiritual values 
which are difficult to valuate in monetary terms. Moreover, monetarisation must incorporate 
all spatial levels (from the household to the global level) which require ecologists to 
determine the biophysical flows of goods and services which is a complex and time-
consuming task (Du Toit et al., 2004).  Economic instruments work on the basis of market 
principles.  As a result, they work best in situations where accurate pricing and valuation is 
possible (UNEP, 2004).  In addition, when the situation requires immediate action such as in 
the case of species threatened of extinction, economic instruments may not be appropriate 
(UNEP, 2004).   
 
One of the strongest limitations to the application of economic instruments is related to the 
institutional context of developing countries.  Economic instruments are said to rely on 
market principles, but this does not imply that the government does not have an important 
role to play in their implementation (UNEP, 2004).  Effectively, one of the major limitations 
is the lack of an adequate institutional structure for the implementation and management of 
these instruments (UNEP, 2004).  This is necessary to ensure that legislations are respected, 
to collect funds, to coordinate project activities, to monitor protected areas, to ensure that 
revenues will be properly reinvested in biodiversity conservation programs, etc.  In the 
absence of a strong institutional framework, the application of economic tools is limited.  In 
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Brazil, despite increases in staff and financial resources, illegal deforestation persists, and the 
IBAMA is still largely unable to penalize offenders and to collect fines (Tabarelli et al., 
2005).  In addition, there is a permanent lobby to expand agricultural lands, residential areas, 
and land settlements (Tabarelli et al., 2005).  We believe that there is a strong necessity to 
reinforce the institutional framework of developing countries if we want any economical tool 
to have significant positive impacts on biodiversity conservation.  This will be achieved 
through transfers of financial and technical resources and through capacitation as have been 
called by the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD, 2005).  Ideological resistance, lack 
of inclusion of communities, and undefined property rights are also limitations associated 
with the context (UNEP, 2004).  
 
Some authors argue that direct payments are the unique solution (or in the absence of better 
alternatives, the best solution) to preserve biodiversity, while others deny their usefulness in 
protecting biodiversity in the long term (Swart, 2003).  We believe that biodiversity 
conservation must be achieved by both investments in short term actions (for example, direct 
payments), but for these actions to be successful in the long term, they will have to be 
coupled with more indirect incentives that will focus on changing consumers behaviours, 
debate and education, as well as on sustainable development.  As for any conservation effort, 
direct payments must be part of an integrated strategy where they would constitute a start-up 
method for a more sustainable conservation project (Swart, 2003).  Unfortunately, such self-
financing projects which require direct payments only for a short period and then succeed to 
be sustainable economically indefinitely seem to be rare (Ferraro & Kiss, 2003).  In fact, they 
often fail to reach the expected development goals or if they do so, demand may become so 
high that producers will be tempted to engage in non-sustainable activities or competitors 
will enter the market without keeping the conservation objective (Ferraro & Kiss, 2003).  
Direct payments have been demonstrated to be very cost-efficient for short-term 
interventions (Swart, 2003).  They are thus very useful when a threatening catastrophe 
requires rapid action. As people often work reactively in biodiversity conservation, direct 
payments may be of critical importance (Swart, 2003).  Low-income countries may be 
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reluctant to engage sustainable practices because of the substantial efforts that they need to 
realize in the short term for an uncertain future gain (Ferraro & Kiss, 2003).  Moreover, the 
global community benefits from biodiversity conservation and it makes economic and social 
sense that it should participate to its conservation through direct transfers to developing 
countries.  Although no perfect solution exists, direct payments have been demonstrated to be 
a cost-effective and flexible strategy for conservation (Ferraro & Kiss, 2003). 
 
Economic instruments can be effective and flexible mechanisms that act as strong incentives 
for investments in environmental protection, and expansion of markets for products and 
services resulting from sustainable management techniques (UNEP, 2004).  However, strong 
limitations have been identified for their application in developing countries.  Although 
transfer of technological and financial support could help to resolve some institutional 
problems, other problems such as corruption can be much more difficult to address.  As it has 
been mentioned earlier, the challenge is thus to develop an integrated strategy that includes 
short-term direct conservation actions with longer term strategies oriented toward sustainable 
development.  Moreover, some economic instruments may be easier to apply than others.  
For example, markets for organic agriculture, non-timber forest products and sustainable 
forestry have already been developed and are recognised as promising (OECD, 2003).  
Focussing on economic instruments that have already been implemented under similar 
contexts may help to overcome more easily barriers associated with institutional framework. 
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4. The North-eastern Brazilian Atlantic forest 
 
 
The Brazilian Atlantic forest is considered as one of the 25 worlds biodiversity hotspots.  
These represent areas that collectively house the majority of the species of the planet, but are 
under eminent threat (Niesten et al., 2004).  With over 20,000 species of plants, 620 sp. of 
birds, 280 sp. of amphibians, 261 sp. of mammals, 200 sp. of reptiles, of which about 40% 
are endemic, its unique biota has been confined to archipelagos of mostly small to tiny 
islands embedded in an agricultural matrix (Tabarelli & Filho, 2004).  The Northeastern 
Brazilian Atlantic forest is probably the most threatened sector of the Atlantic forest, with 
only 2 % of its original cover remaining.  This is particularly important given that this sector 
has a very distinctive biota that was influenced by the Amazonian forest.  Most of the natural 
habitats have been converted for agricultural purposes and of what is left only a small portion 
is protected in nature reserves, mostly small, isolated and badly managed, that fail to 
represent the totality of the biodiversity of this biome.    This might be particularly critical for 
endangered species that are not protected in existing reserves.  To illustrate this, Tabarelli 
and his colleagues (2005) estimated that among the 104 threatened vertebrate species of the 
Brazilian Atlantic forest, 57 have not been recorded in any protected areas.   As a result, 
ecological processes, such as pollination and dispersion, are highly affected and many 
species could not be able to maintain viable populations in the long-term. If the actual trend 
continues, the north-eastern Brazilian Atlantic forest could experience a severe 
impoverishment in shade-tolerant and large-seeded tree species.  In the future, it will 
probably be dominated by tree species abiotically dispersed and tree species bearing small 
fruits, as large fruit-eating birds and large frugivorous vertebrates will be locally extirpated or 
will be restricted to large forest fragments as they will be unable to cross large tracts of 
inhospitable matrix.  In fact, some scientists believe that large frugivorous birds and 
mammals should be considered as umbrella species, that is, as species that require special 
attention as they are necessary to maintain key ecological processes for forest maintenance 
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and regeneration.  Conservation actions in the Atlantic forest now focus on transforming 
medium-to-large fragments into protected areas.  However, as most priority areas in north-
eastern Brazil are too small to maintain viable populations of large fruit-eating birds and 
mammals, conservation actions should be reviewed and should rather seek to increase 
connectivity and find conservation strategies at the bioregional level.  It is important to 
emphasize that despite inadequate budgets, human resources and constant land use pressures, 
protected areas are necessary as they constitute the most direct way to protect areas of special 
concern for biodiversity conservation against the expanding agricultural frontiers (Niesten et 
al., 2004).  However, as most of the remaining Atlantic forests of north-eastern Brazil is 
located on private lands, and, as mentioned previously, as most fragments are too small to 
maintain ecological processes, creation of new nature reserves will not be sufficient and one 
will need to develop innovative strategies to develop networks of sustainable landscapes at 
the regional level (Tabarelli et al., 2005).  Over the last decades, biodiversity conservation 
efforts have been multiplied in the north-eastern Brazilian Atlantic forest (Tabarelli et al., 
2005).  Effectively, numerous environmental funds, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), protected areas, and incentive mechanisms have been created to contribute to 
biodiversity protection.  However, their impacts have been limited and they are still 
insufficient to adequately preserve biological diversity (Tabarelli et al., 2005).  Managers are 
thus facing a great challenge which is to develop innovative strategies which will represent 
incentives for conservation in the long-term.  This will be achieved by integrating actual 
regulations, public policies, new opportunities, incentive mechanisms for forest protection 
and resoration, and governmental and non-governmental projects and programs in a single 
comprehensive strategy. 
 
Particularly in the case of the north-eastern Brazilian Atlantic forest, where the original cover 
as been reduced to 2% due to forest conversion for sugarcane production, and where forest 
lies on the private lands of sugarcane companies, protection of biodiversity and associated 
ecosystem services require commitment of commodity producers, as well as direct 
investments in conservation (Tabarelli & Roda, 2005).  Economical instruments can be used 
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to incite private companies to engage in conservation activities (UNEP, 2004).  For example, 
charge schemes could be implemented to sugarcane companies, such as pesticide and 
fertilizer charges.  Tax deductions could also be offered to companies that engage into 
reforestation or conservation activities.  In addition, through reforestation activities, they 
could become eligible to earn carbon emissions credits (CERs) under the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol (Jung, 2005).  However, actual regulations have 
been identified has being still largely inadequate and poorly enforced (Tabarelli & Roda, 
2005), which may indicate that the potential for economic instruments is limited due to 
institutional limitations.  Conservationists and landscape managers are expected to develop 
partnerships with the sugar sector in order to develop better management practices which will 
include habitat protection, control of fire and pesticides, creation and financing of protected 
areas, reforestation of riverbanks and implementation of forest corridors (Tabarelli & Roda, 
2005).    In addition, sugar companies are starting to understand the potential benefits of 
using better management practices for public image, market and water supply.  
Environmental certification and eco-labelling thus represent a great potential to further 
stimulate companies to engage in conservation projects.  By using these economic 
instruments, conservationists can achieve increased benefits in biodiversity protection and 
private company managers can gain monetary benefits. Sugar companies are thus key 
partners in developing a single comprehensive strategy that will result in greater connectivity 
at the regional landscape level and that represents the only way for remaining biodiversity of 
the region to be able to persist in the long term (Tabarelli et al., 2005).  Governments will 
also need to find market mechanisms for forest restoration, ecotourism and ecosystem 
services (Tabarelli & Filho, 2004).  Local populations must also be involved (Tabarelli & 
Filho, 2004).  We have observed that in Serra Grande, local populations seem to neglect local 
environment protection.  For example, watercourses are being polluted by wastes that are left 
behind by residents of the local communities; no care is given to waste disposal, etc.  
Although this observation is very subjective, it could be interesting to determine if the 
absence of property rights can explain a lack of incentives to protect their environment.   
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Conclusion 
 
 
Various economic instruments can be used as a flexible and efficient way to increase 
biodiversity protection.  These include defining property rights, market creation and 
enhancement, charges, fiscal instruments, financial assistance, liability systems and 
environmental funds.  Although their application can be strongly limited by institutional 
factors, economic instruments must be implemented as part of a global strategy that will 
include both short-term direct actions and longer term initiatives.  Prior to the 
implementation of new economic instruments, we also suggest verifying if the actual 
economical practices are adequate.  For example, it would be important to suppress 
agricultural subventions that favours land conversion over forest protection, rather than 
trying to implement other economic incentives to stimulate forest conservation.  The idea is 
to ensure that strategies are not contradictory and that our efforts are efficient.   
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